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Abstract
We propose a unified mechanism for achieving
coordination and communication in Multi-Agent
Reinforcement Learning (MARL), through
rewarding agents for having causal influence
over other agents’ actions. Causal influence is
assessed using counterfactual reasoning. At each
timestep, an agent simulates alternate actions that
it could have taken, and computes their effect on
the behavior of other agents. Actions that lead to
bigger changes in other agents’ behavior are con-
sidered influential and are rewarded. We show that
this is equivalent to rewarding agents for having
high mutual information between their actions.
Empirical results demonstrate that influence leads
to enhanced coordination and communication
in challenging social dilemma environments,
dramatically increasing the learning curves of the
deep RL agents, and leading to more meaningful
learned communication protocols. The influence
rewards for all agents can be computed in a
decentralized way by enabling agents to learn a
model of other agents using deep neural networks.
In contrast, key previous works on emergent
communication in the MARL setting were unable
to learn diverse policies in a decentralized manner
and had to resort to centralized training. Conse-
quently, the influence reward opens up a window
of new opportunities for research in this area.
1. Introduction
Intrinsic Motivation for Reinforcement Learning (RL) refers
to reward functions that allow agents to learn useful behavior
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across a variety of tasks and environments, sometimes in
the absence of environmental reward (Singh et al., 2004).
Previous approaches to intrinsic motivation often focus on
curiosity (e.g. Pathak et al. (2017); Schmidhuber (2010)),
or empowerment (e.g. Klyubin et al. (2005); Mohamed &
Rezende (2015)). Here, we consider the problem of deriving
intrinsic social motivation from other agents in multi-agent
RL (MARL). Social learning is incredibly important for
humans, and has been linked to our ability to achieve
unprecedented progress and coordination on a massive scale
(Henrich, 2015; Harari, 2014; Laland, 2017; van Schaik &
Burkart, 2011; Herrmann et al., 2007). While some previous
work has investigated intrinsic social motivation for RL (e.g.
Sequeira et al. (2011); Hughes et al. (2018); Peysakhovich &
Lerer (2018)), these approaches rely on hand-crafted rewards
specific to the environment, or allowing agents to view the
rewards obtained by other agents. Such assumptions make it
impossible to achieve independent training of MARL agents
across multiple environments.
Achieving coordination among agents in MARL still remains
a difficult problem. Prior work in this domain (e.g., Foerster
et al. (2017; 2016)), often resorts to centralized training to
ensure that agents learn to coordinate. While communication
among agents could help with coordination, training emer-
gent communication protocols also remains a challenging
problem; recent empirical results underscore the difficulty
of learning meaningful emergent communication protocols,
even when relying on centralized training (e.g., Lazaridou
et al. (2018); Cao et al. (2018); Foerster et al. (2016)).
We propose a unified method for achieving both coordination
and communication in MARL by giving agents an intrinsic
reward for having a causal influence on other agents’ actions.
Causal influence is assessed using counterfactual reasoning;
at each timestep, an agent simulates alternate, counterfactual
actions that it could have taken, and assesses their effect
on another agent’s behavior. Actions that lead to relatively
higher change in the other agent’s behavior are considered
to be highly influential and are rewarded. We show how
this reward is related to maximizing the mutual information
between agents’ actions, and hypothesize that this inductive
bias will drive agents to learn coordinated behavior. Maximiz-
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ing mutual information as a form of intrinsic motivation has
been studied in the literature on empowerment (e.g. Klyubin
et al. (2005); Mohamed & Rezende (2015)). Social influence
can be seen as a novel, social form of empowerment.
To study our influence reward, we adopt the Sequential So-
cial Dilemma (SSD) multi-agent environments of Leibo et al.
(2017). Through a series of three experiments, we show that
the proposed social influence reward allows agents to learn to
coordinate and communicate more effectively in these SSDs.
We train recurrent neural network policies directly from pix-
els, and show in the first experiment that deep RL agents
trained with the proposed social influence reward learn ef-
fectively and attain higher collective reward than powerful
baseline deep RL agents, which often completely fail to learn.
In the second experiment, the influence reward is used to di-
rectly train agents to use an explicit communication channel.
We demonstrate that the communication protocols trained
with the influence reward are more meaningful and effective
for obtaining better collective outcomes. Further, we find
a significant correlation between being influenced through
communication messages and obtaining higher individual re-
ward, suggesting that influential communication is beneficial
to the agents that receive it. By examining the learning curves
in this second experiment, we again find that the influence
reward is essential to allow agents to learn to coordinate.
Finally, we show that influence agents can be trained
independently, when each agent is equipped with an internal
neural network Model of Other Agents (MOA), which has
been trained to predict the actions of every other agent. The
agent can then simulate counterfactual actions and use its
own internal MOA to predict how these will affect other
agents, thereby computing its own intrinsic influence reward.
Influence agents can thus learn socially, only through
observing other agents’ actions, and without requiring a
centralized controller or access to another agent’s reward
function. Therefore, the influence reward offers us a simple,
general and effective way of overcoming long-standing
unrealistic assumptions and limitations in this field of
research, including centralized training and the sharing of
reward functions or policy parameters. Moreover, both
the influence rewards as well as the agents’ policies can be
learned directly from pixels using expressive deep recurrent
neural networks. In this third experiment, the learning curves
once again show that the influence reward is essential for
learning to coordinate in these complex domains.
The paper is structured as follows. We describe the envi-
ronments in Section 2, and the MARL setting in Section 3.
Section 4 introduces the basic formulation of the influence
reward, Section 5 extends it with the inclusion of explicit
communication protocols, and Section 6 advances it by
including models of other agents to achieve independent
training. Each of these three sections presents experiments
and results that empirically demonstrate the efficacy of
the social influence reward. Related work is presented in
Section 7. Finally, more details about the causal inference
procedure are given in Section 8.
2. Sequential Social Dilemmas
Sequential Social Dilemmas (SSDs) (Leibo et al., 2017)
are partially observable, spatially and temporally extended
multi-agent games with a game-theoretic payoff structure.
An individual agent can obtain higher reward in the
short-term by engaging in defecting, non-cooperative
behavior (and thus is greedily motivated to defect), but the
total payoff per agent will be higher if all agents cooperate.
Thus, the collective reward obtained by a group of agents
in these SSDs gives a clear signal about how well the agents
learned to cooperate (Hughes et al., 2018).
We experiment with two SSDs in this work, a public
goods game Cleanup, and a public pool resource game
Harvest. In both games apples (green tiles) provide the
rewards, but are a limited resource. Agents must coordinate
harvesting apples with the behavior of other agents in order
to achieve cooperation (for further details see Section 2 of
the Supplementary Material). For reproducibility, the code
for these games has been made available in open-source.1
As the Schelling diagrams in Figure 10 of the Supplementary
Material reveal, all agents would benefit from learning to
cooperate in these games, because even agents that are being
exploited get higher reward than in the regime where more
agents defect. However, traditional RL agents struggle to
learn to coordinate or cooperate to solve these tasks effec-
tively (Hughes et al., 2018). Thus, these SSDs represent chal-
lenging benchmark tasks for the social influence reward. Not
only must influence agents learn to coordinate their behavior
to obtain high reward, they must also learn to cooperate.
3. Multi-Agent RL for SSDs
We consider a MARL Markov game defined by the tuple
〈S,T,A,r〉, in which multiple agents are trained to indepen-
dently maximize their own individual reward; agents do
not share weights. The environment state is given by s∈S.
At each timestep t, each agent k chooses an action akt ∈A.
The actions of all N agents are combined to form a joint
action at = [a0t ,...a
N
t ], which produces a transition in the
environment T (st+1|at,st), according to the state transition
distribution T . Each agent then receives its own reward
rk(at,st), which may depend on the actions of other agents.
A history of these variables over time is termed a trajectory,
τ = {st,at,rt}Tt=0. We consider a partially observable
1https://github.com/eugenevinitsky/
sequential_social_dilemma_games
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setting in which the kth agent can only view a portion of
the true state, skt . Each agent seeks to maximize its own
total expected discounted future reward,Rk=
∑∞
i=0γ
irkt+i,
where γ is the discount factor. A distributed asynchronous
advantage actor-critic (A3C) approach (Mnih et al., 2016)
is used to train each agent’s policy pik.
Our neural networks consist of a convolutional layer, fully
connected layers, a Long Short Term Memory (LSTM)
recurrent layer (Gers et al., 1999), and linear layers. All
networks take images as input and output both the policy pik
and the value function V pik(s), but some network variants
consume additional inputs and output either communication
policies or models of other agents’ behavior. We will refer to
the internal LSTM state of the kth agent at timestep t as ukt .
4. Basic Social Influence
Social influence intrinsic motivation gives an agent addi-
tional reward for having a causal influence on another agent’s
actions. Specifically, it modifies an agent’s immediate reward
so that it becomes rkt =αe
k
t +βc
k
t , where e
k
t is the extrinsic or
environmental reward, and ckt is the causal influence reward.
To compute the causal influence of one agent on another,
suppose there are two agents, k and j, and that agent j is
able to condition its policy on agent k’s action at time t, akt .
Thus, agent j computes the probability of its next action
as p(ajt |akt ,sjt ). We can then intervene on akt by replacing
it with a counterfactual action, a˜kt . This counterfactual
action is used to compute a new distribution over j’s next
action, p(ajt |a˜kt ,sjt ). Essentially, agent k asks a retrospective
question: “How would j’s action change if I had acted
differently in this situation?”.
By sampling several counterfactual actions, and av-
eraging the resulting policy distribution of j in
each case, we obtain the marginal policy of j,
p(ajt |sjt ) =
∑
a˜kt
p(ajt |a˜kt , sjt )p(a˜kt |sjt ) —in other words,
j’s policy if it did not consider agent k. The discrepancy
between the marginal policy of j and the conditional policy
of j given k’s action is a measure of the causal influence
of k on j; it gives the degree to which j changes its planned
action distribution because of k’s action. Thus, the causal
influence reward for agent k is:
ckt =
N∑
j=0,j 6=k
[
DKL[p(a
j
t |akt ,sjt )
∥∥∥∑
a˜kt
p(ajt | a˜kt ,sjt )p(a˜kt |sjt )]
]
=
N∑
j=0,j 6=k
[
DKL[p(a
j
t |akt ,sjt )
∥∥∥p(ajt |sjt )]]. (1)
Note that it is possible to use a divergence metric other than
KL; we have found empirically that the influence reward is
robust to the choice of metric.
The reward in Eq. 4 is related to the mutual information (MI)
between the actions of agents k and j, I(ak;aj |s). As the
reward is computed over many trajectories sampled inde-
pendently from the environment, we obtain a Monte-Carlo
estimate of I(ak;aj |s). In expectation, the influence reward
incentivizes agents to maximize the mutual information
between their actions. The proof is given in Section 10.1
of the Supplementary Material. Intuitively, training agents
to maximize the MI between their actions results in more
coordinated behavior.
Moreover, the variance of policy gradient updates increases
as the number of agents in the environment grows (Lowe et al.,
2017). This issue can hinder convergence to equilibrium for
large-scale MARL tasks. Social influence can reduce the
variance of policy gradients by introducing explicit depen-
dencies across the actions of each agent. This is because the
conditional variance of the gradients an agent is receiving
will be less than or equal to the marginalized variance.
Note that for the basic influence model we make two assump-
tions: 1) we use centralized training to compute ckt directly
from the policy of agent j, and 2) we assume that influence is
unidirectional: agents trained with the influence reward can
only influence agents that are not trained with the influence
reward (the sets of influencers and influencees are disjoint,
and the number of influencers is in [1,N−1]). Both of these
assumptions are relaxed in later sections. Further details, as
well as further explanation of the causal inference procedure
(including causal diagrams) are available in Section 8.
4.1. Experiment I: Basic Influence
Figure 1 shows the results of testing agents trained with the
basic influence reward against standard A3C agents, and an
ablated version of the model in which agents do not receive
the influence reward, but are able to condition their policy
on the actions of other agents (even when the other agents
are not within the agent’s partially observed view of the
environment). We term this ablated model the visible actions
baseline. In this and all other results figures, we measure
the total collective reward obtained using the best hyper-
parameter setting tested with 5 random seeds each. Error
bars show a 99.5% confidence interval (CI) over the random
seeds, computed within a sliding window of 200 agent steps.
We use a curriculum learning approach which gradually
increases the weight of the social influence reward over C
steps (C∈ [0.2−3.5]×108); this sometimes leads to a slight
delay before the influence models’ performance improves.
As is evident in Figures 1a and 1b, introducing an awareness
of other agents’ actions helps, but having the social influence
reward eventually leads to significantly higher collective
reward in both games. Due to the structure of the SSD games,
we can infer that agents that obtain higher collective reward
learned to cooperate more effectively. In the Harvest MARL
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setting, it is clear that the influence reward is essential to
achieve any reasonable learning.
(a) Cleanup (b) Harvest
Figure 1: Total collective reward obtained in Experiment 1.
Agents trained with influence (red) significantly outperform
the baseline and ablated agents. In Harvest, the influence
reward is essential to achieve any meaningful learning.
To understand how social influence helps agents achieve
cooperative behavior, we investigated the trajectories
produced by high scoring models in both Cleanup and
Harvest; the analysis revealed interesting behavior.
As an example, in the Cleanup video available here:
https://youtu.be/iH_V5WKQxmo a single agent
(shown in purple) was trained with the social influence
reward. Unlike the other agents, which continue to move
and explore randomly while waiting for apples to spawn,
the influencer only traverses the map when it is pursuing an
apple, then stops. The rest of the time it stays still.
Figure 2: A moment
of high influence when
the purple influencer sig-
nals the presence of
an apple (green tiles)
outside the yellow in-
fluencee’s field-of-view
(yellow outlined box).
Figure 2 shows a moment of
high influence between the in-
fluencer and the yellow influ-
encee. The influencer has cho-
sen to move towards an ap-
ple that is outside of the ego-
centric field-of-view of the yel-
low agent. Because the influ-
encer only moves when apples
are available, this signals to the
yellow agent that an apple must
be present above it which it
cannot see. This changes the
yellow agent’s distribution over
its planned action, p(ajt |akt ,sjt ),
and allows the purple agent to
gain influence. A similar mo-
ment occurs when the influ-
encer signals to an agent that has
been cleaning the river that no
apples have appeared by staying
still (see Figure 14 in the Sup-
plementary Material).
In this case study, the influencer agent learned to use its own
actions as a binary code which signals the presence or absence
of apples in the environment. We observe a similar effect in
Harvest. This type of action-based communication could be
likened to the bee waggle dance discovered by von Frisch
(1969). Evidently, the influence reward gave rise not only to
cooperative behavior, but to emergent communication.
It is important to consider the limitations of the influence
reward. Whether it will always give rise to cooperative be-
havior may depend on the specifics of the environment and
task, and tuning the trade-off between environmental and
influence reward. Although influence is arguably necessary
for coordination (e.g. two agents coordinating to manipulate
an object must have a high degree of influence between their
actions), it may be possible to influence another agent in a
non-cooperative way. The results provided here show that the
influence reward did lead to increased cooperation, in spite of
cooperation being difficult to achieve in these environments.
5. Influential Communication
Given the above results, we next experiment with using the
influence reward to train agents to use an explicit commu-
nication channel. We take some inspiration from research
drawing a connection between influence and communication
in human learning. According to Melis & Semmann (2010),
human children rapidly learn to use communication to influ-
ence the behavior of others when engaging in cooperative
activities. They explain that “this ability to influence the
partner via communication has been interpreted as evidence
for a capacity to form shared goals with others”, and that this
capacity may be “what allows humans to engage in a wide
range of cooperative activities”.
Thus, we equip agents with an explicit communication chan-
nel, similar to the approach used by Foerster et al. (2016).
At each timestep, each agent k chooses a discrete commu-
nication symbol mkt ; these symbols are concatenated into
a combined message vector mt = [m0t ,m
1
t ...m
N
t ], for N
agents. This message vector mt is then given as input to
every other agent in the next timestep. Note that previous
work has shown that self-interested agents do not learn to use
this type of ungrounded, cheap talk communication chan-
nel effectively (Crawford & Sobel, 1982; Cao et al., 2018;
Foerster et al., 2016; Lazaridou et al., 2018).
To train the agents to communicate, we augment our initial
network with an additional A3C output head, that learns a
communication policy pim and value function Vm to deter-
mine which symbol to emit (see Figure 3). The normal policy
and value function used for acting in the environment, pie and
Ve, are trained only with environmental reward e. We use
the influence reward as an additional incentive for training
the communication policy, pim, such that r=αe+βc. Coun-
terfactuals are employed to assess how much influence an
agent’s communication message from the previous timestep,
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Figure 3: The communication model has two heads, which
learn the environment policy, pie, and a policy for emitting
communication symbols, pim. Other agents’ communication
messagesmt−1 are input to the LSTM.
mkt−1, has on another agent’s action, a
j
t , where:
ckt =
N∑
j=0,j 6=k
[
DKL[p(a
j
t |mkt−1,sjt )
∥∥∥p(ajt |sjt )]] (2)
Importantly, rewarding influence through a communication
channel does not suffer from the limitation mentioned in the
previous section, i.e. that it may be possible to influence
another agent in a non-cooperative way. We can see this
for two reasons. First, there is nothing that compels agent
j to act based on agent k’s communication message; ifmkt
does not contain valuable information, j is free to ignore it.
Second, because j’s action policy pie is trained only with en-
vironmental reward, j will only change its intended action as
a result of observingmkt (i.e. be influenced bym
k
t ) if it con-
tains information that helps j to obtain environmental reward.
Therefore, we hypothesize that influential communication
must provide useful information to the listener.
5.1. Experiment II: Influential Communication
Figure 4 shows the collective reward obtained when training
the agents to use an explicit communication channel. Here,
the ablated model has the same structure as in Figure 3, but
the communication policy pim is trained only with environ-
mental reward. We observe that the agents incentivized to
communicate via the social influence reward learn faster, and
achieve significantly higher collective reward for the majority
of training in both games. In fact, in the case of Cleanup, we
found thatα=0 in the optimal hyperparameter setting, mean-
ing that it was most effective to train the communication head
with zero extrinsic reward (see Table 2 in the Supplementary
Material). This suggests that influence alone can be a suf-
ficient mechanism for training an effective communication
policy. In Harvest, once again influence is critical to allow
agents to learn coordinated policies and attain high reward.
To analyze the communication behaviour learned by the
agents, we introduce three metrics, partially inspired by
(Bogin et al., 2018). Speaker consistency, is a normalized
score ∈ [0,1] which assesses the entropy of p(ak|mk) and
(a) Cleanup (b) Harvest
Figure 4: Total collective reward for deep RL agents with
communication channels. Once again, the influence reward
is essential to improve or achieve any learning.
p(mk|ak) to determine how consistently a speaker agent
emits a particular symbol when it takes a particular action,
and vice versa (the formula is given in the Supplementary
Material Section 10.4.4). We expect this measure to be
high if, for example, the speaker always emits the same
symbol when it is cleaning the river. We also introduce
two measures of instantaneous coordination (IC), which
are both measures of mutual information (MI): (1) sym-
bol/action IC=I(mkt ;a
j
t+1)measures the MI between the in-
fluencer/speaker’s symbol and the influencee/listener’s next
action, and (2) action/action IC=I(akt ;a
j
t+1)measures the
MI between the influencer’s action and the influencee’s next
action. To compute these measures we first average over all
trajectory steps, then take the maximum value between any
two agents, to determine if any pair of agents are coordinat-
ing. Note that these measures are all instantaneous, as they
consider only short-term dependencies across two consecu-
tive timesteps, and cannot capture if an agent communicates
influential compositional messages, i.e. information that re-
quires several consecutive symbols to transmit and only then
affects the other agents behavior.
Figure 5: Metrics describing the quality of learned com-
munication protocols. The models trained with influence
reward exhibit more consistent communication and more
coordination, especially in moments where influence is high.
Figure 5 presents the results. The speaker consistencies
metric reveals that influence agents more unambiguously
communicate about their own actions than baseline agents,
indicating that the emergent communication is more mean-
ingful. The IC metrics demonstrate that baseline agents
show almost no signs of co-ordinating behavior with com-
munication, i.e. speakers saying A and listeners doing B
consistently. This result is aligned with both theoretical re-
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sults in cheap-talk literature (Crawford & Sobel, 1982), and
recent empirical results in MARL (e.g. Foerster et al. (2016);
Lazaridou et al. (2018); Cao et al. (2018)).
In contrast, we do see high IC between influence agents,
but only when we limit the analysis to timesteps on which
influence was greater than or equal to the mean influence
(cf. influential moments in Figure 5). Inspecting the results
reveals a common pattern: influence is sparse in time. An
agent’s influence is only greater than its mean influence in
less than 10% of timesteps. Because the listener agent is
not compelled to listen to any given speaker, listeners se-
lectively listen to a speaker only when it is beneficial, and
influence cannot occur all the time. Only when the listener
decides to change its action based on the speaker’s message
does influence occur, and in these moments we observe high
I(mkt ;a
j
t+1). It appears the influencers have learned a strat-
egy of communicating meaningful information about their
own actions, and gaining influence when this becomes rele-
vant enough for the listener to act on it.
Examining the relationship between the degree to which
agents were influenced by communication and the reward
they obtained gives a compelling result: agents that are the
most influenced also achieve higher individual environmental
reward. We sampled 100 different experimental conditions
(i.e., hyper-parameters and random seeds) for both games,
and normalized and correlated the influence and individual
rewards. We found that agents who are more often influenced
tend to achieve higher task reward in both Cleanup, ρ= .67,
p<0.001, and Harvest, ρ = .34, p<0.001. This supports
the hypothesis that in order to influence another agent via
communication, the communication message should contain
information that helps the listener maximize its own environ-
mental reward. Since better listeners/influencees are more
successful in terms of task reward, we have evidence that
useful information was transmitted to them.
This result is promising, but may depend on the specific ex-
perimental approach taken here, in which agents interact
with each other repeatedly. In this case, there is no advantage
to the speaker for communicating unreliable information
(i.e. lying), because it would lose influence with the listener
over time. This may not be guaranteed in one-shot interac-
tions. However, given repeated interactions, the above results
provide empirical evidence that social influence as intrinsic
motivation allows agents to learn meaningful communication
protocols when this is otherwise not possible.
6. Modeling Other Agents
Computing the causal influence reward as introduced in Sec-
tion 4 requires knowing the probability of another agent’s
action given a counterfactual, which we previously solved
by using a centralized training approach in which agents
could access other agents’ policy networks. While using a
centralized training framework is common in MARL (e.g.
Foerster et al. (2017; 2016)), it is less realistic than a scenario
in which each agent is trained independently. We can relax
this assumption and achieve independent training by equip-
ping each agent with its own internal Model of Other Agents
(MOA). The MOA consists of a second set of fully-connected
and LSTM layers connected to the agent’s convolutional layer
(see Figure 6), and is trained to predict all other agents’ next
actions given their previous actions, and the agent’s egocen-
tric view of the state: p(at+1|at,skt ). The MOA is trained
using observed action trajectories and cross-entropy loss.
Figure 6: The Model of Other Agents (MOA) architecture
learns both an RL policy pie, and a supervised model that
predicts the actions of other agents, at+1. The supervised
model is used for internally computing the influence reward.
A trained MOA can be used to compute the social influence
reward in the following way. Each agent can “imagine” coun-
terfactual actions that it could have taken at each timestep,
and use its internal MOA to predict the effect on other agents.
It can then give itself reward for taking actions that it esti-
mates were the most influential. This has an intuitive appeal,
because it resembles how humans reason about their effect
on others (Ferguson et al., 2010). We often find ourselves
asking counterfactual questions of the form, “How would she
have acted if I had done something else in that situation?”,
which we answer using our internal model of others.
Learning a model of p(ajt+1|akt ,skt ) requires implicitly mod-
eling both other agents’ internal states and behavior, as well
as the environment transition function. If the model is inaccu-
rate, this would lead to noisy estimates of the causal influence
reward. To compensate for this, We only give the influence
reward to an agent (k) when the agent it is attempting to influ-
ence (j) is within its field-of-view, because the estimates of
p(ajt+1|akt ,skt ) are more accurate when j is visible to k.2 This
constraint could have the side-effect of encouraging agents to
stay in closer proximity. However, an intrinsic social reward
encouraging proximity is reasonable given that humans seek
affiliation and to spend time near other people (Tomasello,
2This contrasts with our previous models in which the influence
reward was obtained even from non-visible agents.
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2009).
6.1. Experiment III: Modeling Other Agents
As before, we allow the policy LSTM of each agent to condi-
tion on the actions of other agents in the last timestep (actions
are visible). We compare against an ablated version of the
architecture shown in Figure 6, which does not use the output
of the MOA to compute a reward; rather, the MOA can be
thought of as an unsupervised auxiliary task that may help the
model to learn a better shared embedding layer, encouraging
it to encode information relevant to predicting other agents’
behavior. Figure 7 shows the collective reward obtained for
agents trained with a MOA module. While we see that the
auxiliary task does help to improve reward over the A3C base-
line, the influence agent gets consistently higher collective
reward. These results demonstrate that the influence reward
can be effectively computed using an internal MOA, and thus
agents can learn socially but independently, optimizing for a
social reward without a centralized controller.
(a) Cleanup (b) Harvest
Figure 7: Total collective reward for MOA models. Again,
intrinsic influence consistently improves learning, with the
powerful A3C agent baselines not being able to learn.
Agents with influence achieve higher collective reward than
the previous state-of-the-art for these environments (275 for
Cleanup and 750 for Harvest) (Hughes et al., 2018). This is
compelling, given that previous work relied on the assump-
tion that agents could view one another’s rewards; we make
no such assumption, instead relying only on agents viewing
each other’s actions. Table 4 of the Supplementary Material
gives the final collective reward obtained in previous work,
and by each influence model for all three experiments.
7. Related work
Several attempts have been made to develop intrinsic social
rewards.3 Sequeira et al. (2011) developed hand-crafted re-
wards for a foraging environment, in which agents were pun-
ished for eating more than their fair share of food. Another
approach gave agents an emotional intrinsic reward based
on their perception of their neighbours’ cooperativeness in
a networked version of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, but
is limited to scenarios in which it is possible to directly clas-
3Note that intrinsic is not a synonym of internal; other people
can be intrinsically motivating (Stavropoulos & Carver, 2013).
sify each action as cooperative or non-cooperative (Yu et al.,
2013). This is untenable in complex settings with long-term
strategies, such as the SSDs under investigation here.
Some approaches allow agents to view each others’ rewards
in order to optimize for collective reward. Peysakhovich &
Lerer (2018) show that if even a single agent is trained to op-
timize for others’ rewards, it can significantly help the group.
Hughes et al. (2018) introduced an inequity aversion moti-
vation, which penalized agents if their rewards differed too
much from those of the group. Liu et al. (2014) train agents
to learn their own optimal reward function in a cooperative,
multi-agent setting with known group reward. However, the
assumption that agents can view and optimize for each oth-
ers’ rewards may be unrealistic. Thus, recent work explores
training agents that learn when to cooperate based solely on
their own past rewards (Peysakhovich & Lerer, 2017).
Training agents to learn emergent communication protocols
has been explored (Foerster et al., 2016; Cao et al., 2018; Choi
et al., 2018; Lazaridou et al., 2018; Bogin et al., 2018), with
many authors finding that selfish agents do not learn to use an
ungrounded, cheap talk communication channel effectively.
Crawford & Sobel (1982) find that in theory, the information
communicated is proportional to the amount of common
interest; thus, as agents’ interests diverge, no communication
is to be expected. And while communication can emerge
when agents are prosocial (Foerster et al., 2016; Lazaridou
et al., 2018), curious (Oudeyer & Kaplan, 2006; Oudeyer &
Smith, 2016; Forestier & Oudeyer, 2017), or hand-crafted
(Crandall et al., 2017), self-interested agents do not to learn
to communicate (Cao et al., 2018). We have shown that
the social influence reward can encourage agents to learn to
communicate more effectively in complex environments.
Our MOA is related to work on machine theory of mind
(Rabinowitz et al., 2018), which demonstrated that a model
trained to predict agents’ actions can model false beliefs.
LOLA agents model the impact of their policy on the param-
eter updates of other agents, and directly incorporate this into
the agent’s own learning rule (Foerster et al., 2018).
Barton et al. (2018) propose causal influence as a way to mea-
sure coordination between agents, specifically using Con-
vergence Cross Mapping (CCM) to analyze the degree of
dependence between two agents’ policies. The limitation
if CCM is that estimates of causality are known to degrade
in the presence of stochastic effects (Tajima et al., 2015).
Counterfactual reasoning has also been used in a multi-agent
setting, to marginalize out the effect of one agent on a pre-
dicted global value function estimating collective reward, and
thus obtain an improved baseline for computing each agent’s
advantage function (Foerster et al., 2017). A similar paper
shows that counterfactuals can be used with potential-based
reward shaping to improve credit assignment for training a
joint policy in multi-agent RL (Devlin et al., 2014). However,
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once again these approaches rely on a centralized controller.
Mutual information (MI) has been explored as a tool for de-
signing social rewards. Strouse et al. (2018) train agents to
optimize the MI between their actions and a categorical goal,
as a way to signal or hide the agent’s intentions. However, this
approach depends on agents pursuing a known, categorical
goal. Guckelsberger et al. (2018), in pursuit of the ultimate
video game adversary, develop an agent that maximizes its
empowerment, minimizes the player’s empowerment, and
maximizes its empowerment over the player’s next state.
This third goal, termed transfer empowerment, is obtained
by maximizing the MI between the agent’s actions and the
player’s future state. While a social form of empowerment,
the authors find that agents trained with transfer empower-
ment simply tend to stay near the player. Further, the agents
are not trained with RL, but rather analytically compute these
measures in simple grid-world environments. As such, the
agent cannot learn to model other agents or the environment.
Given the social influence reward incentivizes maximizing
the mutual information between agents’ actions, our work
also has ties to the literature on empowerment, in which
agents maximize the mutual information between their ac-
tions and their future state (Klyubin et al., 2005; Mohamed &
Rezende, 2015). Thus, our proposed reward can be seen as a
novel social form of empowerment.
8. Details on Causal Inference
The causal influence reward presented in Eq. 4 is assessed
using counterfactual reasoning. Unlike a do-calculus inter-
vention (which estimates the general expected causal effect
of one variable on another), a counterfactual involves condi-
tioning on a set of variables observed in a given situation and
asking how would the outcome have changed if some vari-
able were different, and all other variables remained the same
(Pearl et al., 2016). This type of inquiry allows us to measure
the precise causal effect of agent k’s action at timestep t, akt ,
on agent j’s action, ajt , in the specific environment state st,
providing a richer and less sparse reward for agent k. Com-
puting counterfactuals requires conditioning on the correct
set of observed variables to ensure there are no confounds.
In our case, the conditioning set must include not only an
agent’s partially observed view of the environment state, sjt ,
but also the agent’s internal LSTM state ujt , to remove any
dependency on previous timesteps in the trajectory. Thus, the
basic causal influence reward can be more accurately written:
ckt =
N∑
j=0,j 6=k
[
DKL[p(a
j
t |akt ,sjt ,ujt )||p(ajt |sjt ,ujt )]
]
. (3)
Figure 8 shows the causal diagrams for computing the influ-
ence reward in both the basic case (8a) and the MOA case (8b).
Because basic influence looks at influence between agents’
actions in the same timestep, the diagram is much simpler.
However, to avoid circular dependencies in the graph, it re-
quires that agent k choose its action before j, and therefore
k can influence j but j cannot influence k. If there are more
than two agents, we assume a disjoint set of influencer and
influencee agents, and all influencers must act first.
(a) Basic (b) MOA
Figure 8: Causal diagrams of agent k’s effect on j’s action.
Shaded nodes are conditioned on, and we intervene on akt
(blue node) by replacing it with counterfactuals. Nodes with
a green background must be modeled using the MOA module.
Note that there is no backdoor path between akt and st in the
MOA case, since it would require traversing a collider that is
not in the conditioning set.
Computing influence across timesteps, as in the communica-
tion and MOA experiments, complicates the causal diagram,
but ensures that each agent can influence every other agent.
Figure 8b shows the diagram in the MOA case, in which we
can isolate the causal effect of akt on a
j
t+1 because the back-
door path through st is blocked by the collider nodes at st+1
and ujt+1 (Pearl et al., 2016). Note that it would be sufficient
to condition only on skt in order to block all back-door paths
in this case, but we show 〈ukt ,skt ,ajt 〉 as shaded because all of
these are given as inputs to the MOA to help it predict ajt+1.
For the MOA to accurately estimate p(ajt+1|akt ,skt ), it must
model both the environment transition function T , as well as
aspects of the internal LSTM state of the other agent, ujt+1,
as shown by the shaded green variables in Figure 8b.
This is a simple case of counterfactual reasoning, that does
not require using abduction to update the probability of any
unobserved variables (Pearl, 2013). This is because we have
built all relevant models, know all of their inputs, and can
easily store the values for those variables at every step of the
trajectory in order to condition on them so that there are no
unobserved variables that could act as a confounder.
9. Conclusions and Future Work
All three experiments have shown that the proposed intrinsic
social influence reward consistently leads to higher collec-
tive return. Despite variation in the tasks, hyper-parameters,
neural network architectures and experimental setups, the
learning curves for agents trained with the influence reward
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are significantly better than the curves of powerful agents
such as A3C and their improved baselines. In some cases,
it is clear that influence is essential to achieve any form of
learning, attesting to the promise of this idea and highlight-
ing the complexity of learning general deep neural network
multi-agent policies.
Experiment I also showed that the influence reward can lead
to the emergence of communication protocols. In experiment
II, which included an explicit communication channel, we
saw that influence improved communication. Experiment
III showed that influence can be computed by augmenting
agents with an internal model of other agents. The influ-
ence reward can thus be computed without having access to
another agent’s reward function, or requiring a centralized
controller. We were able to surpass state-of-the-art perfor-
mance on the SSDs studied here, despite the fact that previous
work relied on agents’ ability to view other agents’ rewards.
Using counterfactuals to allow agents to understand the ef-
fects of their actions on others is a promising approach with
many extensions. Agents could use counterfactuals to de-
velop a form of ‘empathy’, by simulating how their actions
affect another agent’s value function. Influence could also
be used to drive coordinated behavior in robots attempting to
do cooperative manipulation and control tasks. Finally, if we
view multi-agent networks as single agents, influence could
be used as a regularizer to encourage different modules of the
network to integrate information from other networks; for
example, to hopefully prevent collapse in hierarchical RL.
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10. Supplementary Material
10.1. Influence as Mutual Information
The causal influence of agent k on agent j is:
DKL
[
p(ajt |akt ,zt)
∥∥∥p(ajt |zt)], (4)
where zt represents all relevant u and s background variables
at timestep t. The influence reward to the mutual information
(MI) between the actions of agents k and j, which is given by
I(Aj ;Ak|z)=
∑
ak,aj
p(aj ,ak|z)log p(a
j ,ak|z)
p(aj |z)p(ak|z)
=
∑
ak
p(ak|z)DKL
[
p(aj |ak,z)
∥∥∥p(aj |z)], (5)
where we see that the DKL factor in Eq. 5 is the causal
influence reward given in Eq. 4.
By samplingN independent trajectories τn from the environ-
ment, where k’s actions akn are drawn according to p(a
k|z),
we perform a Monte-Carlo approximation of the MI (see e.g.
Strouse et al. (2018)),
I(Ak;Aj |z)=Eτ
[
DKL
[
p(Aj |Ak,z)∥∥p(Aj |z)]∣∣∣z]
≈ 1
N
∑
n
DKL
[
p(Aj |akn,z)
∥∥p(Aj |z)]. (6)
Thus, in expectation, the social influence reward is the MI
between agents’ actions.
Whether the policy trained with Eq. 4 actually learns to ap-
proximate the MI depends on the learning dynamics. We
calculate the intrinsic social influence reward using Eq. 4, be-
cause unlike Eq. 5, which gives an estimate of the symmetric
bandwidth between k and j, Eq. 4 gives the directed causal
effect of the specific action taken by agent k, akt . We believe
this will result in an easier reward to learn, since it allows for
better credit assignment; agent k can more easily learn which
of its actions lead to high influence.
The connection to mutual information is interesting, because
a frequently used intrinsic motivation for single agent RL
is empowerment, which rewards the agent for having high
mutual information between its actions and the future state
of the environment (e.g. Klyubin et al. (2005); Capdepuy
et al. (2007)). To the extent that the social influence reward
approximates the MI, k is rewarded for having empowerment
over j’s actions.
The social influence reward can also be computed using
other divergence measures besides KL-divergence. Lizier &
Prokopenko (2010) propose local information flow as a mea-
sure of direct causal effect; this is equivalent to the pointwise
mutual information (the innermost term of Eq. 6), given by:
pmi(ak;aj |Z=z)=logp(a
j |ak,z)
p(aj |z)
=log
p(ak,aj |z)
p(ak |z)p(aj |z) . (7)
The PMI gives us a measure of influence of a single action of
k on the single action taken by j. The expectation of the PMI
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over p(aj ,ak|z) is the MI. We experiment with using the PMI
and a number of divergence measures, including the Jensen-
Shannon Divergence (JSD), and find that the influence reward
is robust to the choice of measure.
10.2. Sequential Social Dilemmas
Figure 9 depicts the SSD games under investigation. In each
of the games, an agent is rewarded +1 for every apple it
collects, but the apples are a limited resource. Agents have
the ability to punish each other with a fining beam, which
costs−1 reward to fire, and fines any agent it hits−50 reward.
In Cleanup (a public goods game) agents must clean a
river before apples can grow, but are not able to harvest
apples while cleaning. In Harvest (a common pool resource
game), apples respawn at a rate proportional to the amount
of nearby apples; if apples are harvested too quickly, they
will not grow back. Both coordination, and cooperation
are required to solve both games. In Cleanup, agents
must efficiently time harvesting apples and cleaning
the river, and allow agents cleaning the river a chance
to consume apples. In Harvest, agents must spatially
distribute their harvesting, and abstain from consuming
apples too quickly in order to harvest sustainably. The
code for these games, including hyperparameter settings
and apple and waste respawn probabilities, can be found
at https://github.com/eugenevinitsky/
sequential_social_dilemma_games.
The reward structure of the games is shown in Figure 10,
which gives the Schelling diagram for both SSD tasks under
investigation. A Schelling diagram (Schelling, 1973; Perolat
et al., 2017) depicts the relative payoffs for a single agent’s
strategy given a fixed number of other agents who are coop-
erative. These diagrams show that all agents would benefit
from learning to cooperate, because even the agents that are
being exploited get higher reward than in the regime where
all agents defect. However, traditional RL agents struggle to
learn to cooperate and solve these tasks effectively (Hughes
et al., 2018).
10.3. Additional experiment - Box Trapped
As a proof-of-concept experiment to test whether the influ-
ence reward works as expected, we constructed a special
environment, shown in Figure 11. In this environment, one
agent (teal) is trapped in a box. The other agent (purple) has
a special action it can use to open the box... or it can simply
choose to consume apples, which exist outside the box and
are inexhaustible in this environment.
As expected, a vanilla A3C agent learns to act selfishly; the
purple agent will simply consume apples, and chooses the
open box action in 0% of trajectories once the policy has con-
verged. A video of A3C agents trained in this environment
is available at: https://youtu.be/C8SE9_YKzxI,
which shows that the purple agent leaves its compatriot
trapped in the box throughout the trajectory.
In contrast, an agent trained with the social influence re-
ward chooses the open box action in 88% of trajectories,
releasing its fellow agent so that they are both able to
consume apples. A video of this behavior is shown at:
https://youtu.be/Gfo248-qt3c. Further, as Fig-
ure 12 reveals, the purple influencer agent usually chooses to
open the box within the first few steps of the trajetory, giving
its fellow agent more time to collect reward.
Most importantly though, Figure 13 shows the influence
reward over the course of a trajectory in the Box trapped
environment. The agent chooses the open box action in the
second timestep; at this point, we see a corresponding spike
in the influence reward. This reveals that the influence reward
works as expected, incentivizing an action which has a strong
— and in this case, prosocial — effect on the other agent’s
behavior.
10.4. Implementation details
All models are trained with a single convolutional layer with
a kernel of size 3, stride of size 1, and 6 output channels.
This is connected to two fully connected layers of size 32
each, and an LSTM with 128 cells. We use a discount factor
γ= .99. The number of agentsN is fixed to 5.
In addition to the comparison function used to compute influ-
ence (e.g. KL-divergence, PMI, JSD), there are many other
hyperparameters that can be tuned for each model. We use a
random search over hyperparameters, ensuring a fair compar-
ison with the search size over the baseline parameters that are
shared with the influence models. For all models we search
for the optimal entropy reward and learning rate, where we
anneal the learning rate from an initial value lr init to
lr final. The below sections give the parameters found
to be most effective for each of the three experiments.
10.4.1. BASIC INFLUENCE HYPERPARAMETERS
In this setting we vary the number of influencers from 1−4,
the influence reward weight β, and the number of curriculum
steps over which the weight of the influence reward is lin-
early increasedC. In this setting, since we have a centralised
controller, we also experiment with giving the influence re-
ward to the agent being influenced as well, and find that this
sometimes helps. This ‘influencee’ reward is not used in the
other two experiments, since it precludes independent train-
ing. The hyperparameters found to give the best performance
for each model are shown in Table 1.
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Figure 9: The two SSD environments, Cleanup (left) and Harvest (right). Agents can exploit other agents for immediate
payoff, but at the expense of the long-term collective reward of the group. Reproduced with permission from Hughes et al.
(2018).
(a) Cleanup (b) Harvest
Figure 10: Schelling diagrams for the two social dilemma tasks show that an individual agent is motivated to defect, though
everyone benefits when more agents cooperate. Reproduced with permission from Hughes et al. (2018).
Cleanup Harvest
Hyperparameter A3Cbaseline
Visible actions
baseline Influence
A3C
baseline
Visible actions
baseline Influence
Entropy reg. .00176 .00176 .000248 .000687 .00184 .00025
lr init .00126 .00126 .00107 .00136 .00215 .00107
lr end .000012 .000012 .000042 .000028 .000013 .000042
Number of influencers - 3 1 - 3 3
Influence weight β - 0 .146 - 0 .224
CurriculumC - - 140 - - 140
Policy comparison - - JSD - - PMI
Influencee reward - - 1 - - 0
Table 1: Optimal hyperparameter settings for the models in the basic influence experiment.
Figure 11: The Box trapped environment in which the teal
agent is trapped, and the purple agent can release it with a
special open box action.
10.4.2. COMMUNICATION HYPERPARAMETERS
Because the communication models have an extra A2C out-
put head for the communication policy, we use an additional
entropy regularization term just for this head, and apply a
weight to the communication loss in the loss function. We
also vary the number of communication symbols that the
agents can emit, and the size of the linear layer that connects
the LSTM to the communication policy layer, which we term
the communication embedding size. Finally, in the commu-
nication regime, we experiment to setting the weight on the
extrinsic reward E, α, to zero. The best hyperparameters for
each of the communication models are shown in Table 2.
10.4.3. MODEL OF OTHER AGENTS (MOA)
HYPERPARAMETERS
The MOA hyperparameters include whether to only train the
MOA with cross-entropy loss on the actions of agents that
are visible, and how much to weight the supervised loss in
the overall loss of the model. The best hyperparameters are
shown in Table 3.
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Cleanup Harvest
Hyperparameter A3Cbaseline
Comm.
baseline
Influence
comm.
A3C
baseline
Comm.
baseline
Influence
comm.
Entropy reg. .00176 .000249 .00305 .000687 .000174 .00220
lr init .00126 .00223 .00249 .00136 .00137 .000413
lr end .000012 .000022 .0000127 .000028 .0000127 .000049
Influence weight β - 0 2.752 - 0 4.825
Extrinsic reward
weight α - - 0 - - 1.0
CurriculumC - - 1 - - 8
Policy comparison - - KL - - KL
Comm. entropy reg. - - .000789 - - .00208
Comm. loss weight - - .0758 - - .0709
Symbol vocab size - - 9 - - 7
Comm. embedding - - 32 - - 16
Table 2: Optimal hyperparameter settings for the models in the communication experiment.
Cleanup Harvest
Hyperparameter A3Cbaseline
MOA
baseline
Influence
MOA
A3C
baseline
MOA
baseline
Influence
MOA
Entropy reg. .00176 .00176 .00176 .000687 .00495 .00223
lr init .00126 .00123 .00123 .00136 .00206 .00120
lr end .000012 .000012 .000012 .000028 .000022 .000044
Influence weight β - 0 .620 - 0 2.521
MOA loss weight - 1.312 15.007 - 1.711 10.911
CurriculumC - - 40 - - 226
Policy comparison - - KL - - KL
Train MOA only
when visible - False True - False True
Table 3: Optimal hyperparameter settings for the models in the model of other agents (MOA) experiment.
Figure 12: Number of times the open box action occurs at
each trajectory step over 100 trajectories.
Figure 13: Influence reward over a trajectory in Box trapped.
An agent gets high influence for letting another agent out of
the box in which it is trapped.
10.4.4. COMMUNICATION ANALYSIS
The speaker consistency metric is calculated as:
N∑
k=1
0.5[
∑
c
1−H(p(a
k|mk=c))
Hmax
+
∑
a
1−H(p(m
k|ak=a))
Hmax
], (8)
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whereH is the entropy function andHmax is the maximum
entropy based on the number of discrete symbols or actions.
The goal of the metric is to measure how much of a 1:1
correspondence exists between a speaker’s action and the
speaker’s communication message.
10.5. Additional results
10.5.1. BASIC INFLUENCE EMERGENT COMMUNICATION
Figure 14 shows an additional moment of high influence in
the Cleanup game. The purple influencer agent can see the
area within the white box, and therefore all of the apple patch.
The field-of-view of the magenta influencee is outlined with
the magenta box; it cannot see if apples have appeared, even
though it has been cleaning the river, which is the action re-
quired to cause apples to appear. When the purple influencer
turns left and does not move towards the apple patch, this
signals to the magenta agent that no apples have appeared,
since otherwise the influence would move right.
Figure 14: A moment of high influence between the purple
influencer and magenta influencee.
10.5.2. OPTIMIZING FOR COLLECTIVE REWARD
(a) Cleanup (b) Tragedy
Figure 15: Total collective reward obtained by agents trained
to optimize for the collective reward, for the 5 best hyperpa-
rameter settings with 5 random seeds each. Error bars show
a 99.5% confidence interval (CI) computed within a sliding
window of 200 agent steps.
In this section we include the results of training explicitly
prosocial agents, which directly optimize for the collective
reward of all agents. Previous work (e.g. Peysakhovich &
Lerer (2018)) has shown that training agents to optimize
for the rewards of other agents can help the group to obtain
better collective outcomes. Following a similar principle, we
implemented agents that optimize for a convex combination
of their own individual reward ekt and the collective reward
of all other agents,
∑N
i=1,i6=ke
i
t. Thus, the reward function
for agent k is rkt = e
k
t + η
∑N
i=1,i6=k e
i
t. We conducted the
same hyperparameter search over the parameters mentioned
in Section 10.4.1 varying the weight placed on the collective
reward, η∈ [0,2].
As expected, we find that agents trained to optimize for col-
lective reward attain higher collective reward in both Cleanup
and Harvest, as is shown in Figure 15. In both games, the
optimal value for η=0.85. Interestingly, however, the equal-
ity in the individual returns for these agents is extremely low.
Across the hyperparameter sweep, no solution to the Cleanup
game which scored more than 20 points in terms of collective
return was found in which all agents scored an individual
return above 0. It seems that in Cleanup, when agents are
trained to optimize for collective return, they converge on a
solution in which some agents never receive any reward.
Note that training agents to optimize for collective reward
requires that each agent can view the rewards obtained by
other agents. As discussed previously, the social influence
reward is a novel way to obtain cooperative behavior, that
does not require making this assumption.
10.5.3. COLLECTIVE REWARD AND EQUALITY
It is important to note that collective reward is not always the
perfect metric of cooperative behavior, a finding that was also
discovered by Barton et al. (2018) and emphasized by Leibo
et al. (2017). In the case, we find that there is a spurious
solution to the Harvest game, in which one agent fails to
learn and fails to collect any apples. This leads to very high
collective reward, since it means there is one fewer agent
that can exploit the others, and makes sustainable harvesting
easier to achieve. Therefore, for the results shown in the
paper, we eliminate any random seed in Harvest for which
one of the agents has failed to learn to collect apples, as in
previous work (Hughes et al., 2018).
However, here we also present an alternative strategy for
assessing the overall collective outcomes: weighting the total
collective reward by an index of equality of the individual
rewards. Specifically, we compute the Gini coefficient over
theN agents’ individual environmental rewards ekt :
G=
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1|eit−ejt |
2N
∑N
i=1e
i
t
, (9)
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which gives us a measure of the inequality of the returns,
whereG∈ [0,1], withG=0 indicating perfect equality. Thus,
1−G is a measure of equality; we use this to weight the
collective reward for each experiment, and plot the results in
Figure 16. Once again, we see that the influence models give
the highest final performance, even with this new metric.
10.5.4. COLLECTIVE REWARD OVER MULTIPLE
HYPERPARAMETERS
Finally, we would like to show that the influence reward is
robust to the choice of hyperparameter settings. Therefore,
in Figure 17, we plot the collective reward of the top 5 best
hyperparameter settings for each experiment, over 5 random
seeds each. Once again, the influence models result in higher
collective reward, which provides evidence that the model is
robust to the choice of hyperparameters.
10.5.5. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BETWEEN MODELS
AND RELATED WORK
Table 4 presents the final collective reward obtained by each
of the models tested in the experiments presented in the
paper. We see that in several cases, the influence agents are
even able to out-perform the state-of-the-art results on these
tasks reported by (Hughes et al., 2018), despite the fact that
the solution proposed by (Hughes et al., 2018) requires that
agents can view other agents’ rewards, whereas we do not
make this assumption, and instead only require that agents
can view each others’ actions.
Cleanup Harvest
A3C baseline 89 485
Inequity aversion (Hughes et al.) 275 750
Influence - Basic 190 1073
Influence - Communication 166 951
Influence - Model of other agents 392 588
Table 4: Final collective reward over the last 50 agent steps
for each of the models considered. Bolded entries represent
experiments in which the influence models significantly out-
performed the scores reported in previous work on inequity
aversion (Hughes et al., 2018). This is impressive, consid-
ering the inequity averse agents are able to view all other
agents’ rewards. We make no such assumption, and yet are
able to achieve similar or superior performance.
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(a) Cleanup - Basic influence (b) Harvest - Basic influence
(c) Cleanup - Communication (d) Harvest - Communication
(e) Cleanup - Model of other agents (f) Harvest - Model of other agents
Figure 16: Total collective reward times equality,R∗(1−G), obtained in all experiments. Error bars show a 99.5% confidence
interval (CI) over 5 random seeds, computed within a sliding window of 200 agent steps. Once again, the models trained with
influence reward (red) significantly outperform the baseline and ablated models.
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(a) Cleanup - Basic influence (b) Harvest - Basic influence
(c) Cleanup - Communication (d) Harvest - Communication
(e) Cleanup - Model of other agents (f) Harvest - Model of other agents
Figure 17: Total collective reward over the top 5 hyperparameter settings, with 5 random seeds each, for all experiments. Error
bars show a 99.5% confidence interval (CI) computed within a sliding window of 200 agent steps. The influence models
still maintain an advantage over the baselines and ablated models, suggesting the technique is robust to the hyperparameter
settings.
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1. Influence as Mutual Information
The causal influence of agent k on agent j is:
DKL
[
p(ajt | akt , zt)
∥∥∥p(ajt | zt)] , (1)
where zt represents the conditioning variables at timestep
t, zt = 〈ujt , sjt 〉. The influence reward to the mutual infor-
mation (MI) between the actions of agents k and j, which
is given by
I(Aj ;Ak|z) =
∑
ak,aj
p(aj , ak|z) log p(a
j , ak|z)
p(aj |z)p(ak|z)
=
∑
ak
p(ak|z)DKL
[
p(aj |ak, z)
∥∥∥p(aj |z)],
(2)
where we see that the DKL factor in Eq. 2 is the causal
influence reward given in Eq. 1.
By sampling N independent trajectories τn from the en-
vironment, where k’s actions akn are drawn according to
p(ak|z), we perform a Monte-Carlo approximation of the
MI (see e.g. ?),
I(Ak;Aj |z) = Eτ
[
DKL
[
p(Aj |Ak, z)∥∥p(Aj |z)]∣∣∣z]
≈ 1
N
∑
n
DKL
[
p(Aj |akn, z)
∥∥p(Aj |z)] . (3)
Thus, in expectation, the social influence reward is the MI
between agents’ actions.
Whether the policy trained with Eq. 1 actually learns to
approximate the MI depends on the learning dynamics. We
calculate the intrinsic social influence reward using Eq. 1,
because unlike Eq. 2, which gives an estimate of the sym-
metric bandwidth between k and j, Eq. 1 gives the directed
causal effect of the specific action taken by agent k, akt . We
1Anonymous Institution, Anonymous City, Anonymous Region,
Anonymous Country. Correspondence to: Anonymous Author
<anon.email@domain.com>.
Preliminary work. Under review by the International Conference
on Machine Learning (ICML). Do not distribute.
believe this will result in an easier reward to learn, since it
allows for better credit assignment; agent k can more easily
learn which of its actions lead to high influence.
The connection to mutual information is interesting, because
a frequently used intrinsic motivation for single agent RL
is empowerment, which rewards the agent for having high
mutual information between its actions and the future state
of the environment (e.g. ??). To the extent that the social
influence reward approximates the MI, k is rewarded for
having empowerment over j’s actions.
The social influence reward can also be computed using
other divergence measures besides KL-divergence. ? pro-
pose local information flow as a measure of direct causal
effect; this is equivalent to the pointwise mutual information
(the innermost term of Eq. 3), given by:
pmi(ak; aj | Z = z) = log p(a
j | ak, z)
p(aj | z)
= log
p(ak, aj | z)
p(ak | z)p(aj | z) . (4)
The PMI gives us a measure of influence of a single action
of k on the single action taken by j. The expectation of the
PMI over p(aj , ak|z) is the MI. We experiment with using
the PMI and a number of divergence measures, including
the Jensen-Shannon Divergence (JSD), and find that the
influence reward is robust to the choice of measure.
2. Sequential Social Dilemmas
Figure 1 depicts the SSD games under investigation. In
each of the games, an agent is rewarded +1 for every apple
it collects, but the apples are a limited resource. Agents
have the ability to punish each other with a fining beam,
which costs −1 reward to fire, and fines any agent it hits
−50 reward.
In Cleanup (a public goods game) agents must clean a
river before apples can grow, but are not able to harvest
apples while cleaning. In Harvest (a common pool resource
game), apples respawn at a rate proportional to the amount
of nearby apples; if apples are harvested too quickly, they
will not grow back. Both coordination, and cooperation
are required to solve both games. In Cleanup, agents
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Figure 1: The two SSD environments, Cleanup (left) and Harvest (right). Agents can exploit other agents for immediate
payoff, but at the expense of the long-term collective reward of the group. Reproduced with permission from ?.
(a) Cleanup (b) Harvest
Figure 2: Schelling diagrams for the two social dilemma tasks show that an individual agent is motivated to defect, though
everyone benefits when more agents cooperate. Reproduced with permission from ?.
must efficiently time harvesting apples and cleaning
the river, and allow agents cleaning the river a chance
to consume apples. In Harvest, agents must spatially
distribute their harvesting, and abstain from consuming
apples too quickly in order to harvest sustainably. The
code for these games, including hyperparameter settings
and apple and waste respawn probabilities, can be found
at https://github.com/eugenevinitsky/
sequential_social_dilemma_games.
The reward structure of the games is shown in Figure 2,
which gives the Schelling diagram for both SSD tasks under
investigation. A Schelling diagram (??) depicts the relative
payoffs for a single agent’s strategy given a fixed number
of other agents who are cooperative. These diagrams show
that all agents would benefit from learning to cooperate,
because even the agents that are being exploited get higher
reward than in the regime where all agents defect. However,
traditional RL agents struggle to learn to cooperate and solve
these tasks effectively (?).
3. Additional experiment - Box Trapped
As a proof-of-concept experiment to test whether the influ-
ence reward works as expected, we constructed a special
environment, shown in Figure 3. In this environment, one
agent (teal) is trapped in a box. The other agent (purple) has
a special action it can use to open the box... or it can simply
choose to consume apples, which exist outside the box and
are inexhaustible in this environment.
As expected, a vanilla A3C agent learns to act selfishly; the
Figure 3: The Box trapped environment in which the teal
agent is trapped, and the purple agent can release it with a
special open box action.
purple agent will simply consume apples, and chooses the
open box action in 0% of trajectories once the policy has con-
verged. A video of A3C agents trained in this environment
is available at: https://youtu.be/C8SE9_YKzxI,
which shows that the purple agent leaves its compatriot
trapped in the box throughout the trajectory.
In contrast, an agent trained with the social influence re-
ward chooses the open box action in 88% of trajectories,
releasing its fellow agent so that they are both able to
consume apples. A video of this behavior is shown at:
https://youtu.be/Gfo248-qt3c. Further, as Fig-
ure 4 reveals, the purple influencer agent usually chooses
to open the box within the first few steps of the trajetory,
giving its fellow agent more time to collect reward.
Most importantly though, Figure 5 shows the influence re-
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ward over the course of a trajectory in the Box trapped
environment. The agent chooses the open box action in
the second timestep; at this point, we see a corresponding
spike in the influence reward. This reveals that the influence
reward works as expected, incentivizing an action which
has a strong — and in this case, prosocial — effect on the
other agent’s behavior.
Figure 4: Number of times the open box action occurs at
each trajectory step over 100 trajectories.
Figure 5: Influence reward over a trajectory in Box trapped.
An agent gets high influence for letting another agent out of
the box in which it is trapped.
4. Implementation details
All models are trained with a single convolutional layer with
a kernel of size 3, stride of size 1, and 6 output channels.
This is connected to two fully connected layers of size 32
each, and an LSTM with 128 cells. We use a discount factor
γ = .99. The number of agents N is fixed to 5.
In addition to the comparison function used to compute
influence (e.g. KL-divergence, PMI, JSD), there are many
other hyperparameters that can be tuned for each model.
We use a random search over hyperparameters, ensuring
a fair comparison with the search size over the baseline
parameters that are shared with the influence models. For
all models we search for the optimal entropy reward and
learning rate, where we anneal the learning rate from an
initial value lr init to lr final. The below sections
give the parameters found to be most effective for each of
the three experiments.
4.1. Basic influence hyperparameters
In this setting we vary the number of influencers from 1− 4,
the influence reward weight β, and the number of curricu-
lum steps over which the weight of the influence reward
is linearly increased C. In this setting, since we have a
centralised controller, we also experiment with giving the
influence reward to the agent being influenced as well, and
find that this sometimes helps. This ‘influencee’ reward is
not used in the other two experiments, since it precludes
independent training. The hyperparameters found to give
the best performance for each model are shown in Table 1.
4.2. Communication hyperparameters
Because the communication models have an extra A2C out-
put head for the communication policy, we use an additional
entropy regularization term just for this head, and apply a
weight to the communication loss in the loss function. We
also vary the number of communication symbols that the
agents can emit, and the size of the linear layer that con-
nects the LSTM to the communication policy layer, which
we term the communication embedding size. Finally, in the
communication regime, we experiment to setting the weight
on the extrinsic reward E, α, to zero. The best hyperparam-
eters for each of the communication models are shown in
Table 2.
4.3. Model of other agents (MOA) hyperparameters
The MOA hyperparameters include whether to only train
the MOA with cross-entropy loss on the actions of agents
that are visible, and how much to weight the supervised loss
in the overall loss of the model. The best hyperparameters
are shown in Table 3.
4.4. Communication analysis
The speaker consistency metric is calculated as:
N∑
k=1
0.5[
∑
c
1− H(p(a
k|mk = c))
Hmax
+
∑
a
1− H(p(m
k|ak = a))
Hmax
], (5)
where H is the entropy function and Hmax is the maximum
entropy based on the number of discrete symbols or actions.
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Cleanup Harvest
Hyperparameter A3Cbaseline
Visible actions
baseline Influence
A3C
baseline
Visible actions
baseline Influence
Entropy reg. .00176 .00176 .000248 .000687 .00184 .00025
lr init .00126 .00126 .00107 .00136 .00215 .00107
lr end .000012 .000012 .000042 .000028 .000013 .000042
Number of influencers - 3 1 - 3 3
Influence weight β - 0 .146 - 0 .224
Curriculum C - - 140 - - 140
Policy comparison - - JSD - - PMI
Influencee reward - - 1 - - 0
Table 1: Optimal hyperparameter settings for the models in the basic influence experiment.
Cleanup Harvest
Hyperparameter A3Cbaseline
Comm.
baseline
Influence
comm.
A3C
baseline
Comm.
baseline
Influence
comm.
Entropy reg. .00176 .000249 .00305 .000687 .000174 .00220
lr init .00126 .00223 .00249 .00136 .00137 .000413
lr end .000012 .000022 .0000127 .000028 .0000127 .000049
Influence weight β - 0 2.752 - 0 4.825
Extrinsic reward
weight α - - 0 - - 1.0
Curriculum C - - 1 - - 8
Policy comparison - - KL - - KL
Comm. entropy reg. - - .000789 - - .00208
Comm. loss weight - - .0758 - - .0709
Symbol vocab size - - 9 - - 7
Comm. embedding - - 32 - - 16
Table 2: Optimal hyperparameter settings for the models in the communication experiment.
The goal of the metric is to measure how much of a 1:1
correspondence exists between a speaker’s action and the
speaker’s communication message.
5. Additional results
5.1. Basic influence emergent communication
Figure 6 shows an additional moment of high influence in
the Cleanup game. The purple influencer agent can see the
area within the white box, and therefore all of the apple
patch. The field-of-view of the magenta influencee is out-
lined with the magenta box; it cannot see if apples have
appeared, even though it has been cleaning the river, which
is the action required to cause apples to appear. When the
purple influencer turns left and does not move towards the
apple patch, this signals to the magenta agent that no apples
have appeared, since otherwise the influence would move
right.
5.2. Optimizing for collective reward
In this section we include the results of training explicitly
prosocial agents, which directly optimize for the collective
reward of all agents. Previous work (e.g. ?) has shown that
training agents to optimize for the rewards of other agents
can help the group to obtain better collective outcomes.
Figure 6: A moment of high influence between the purple
influencer and magenta influencee.
Following a similar principle, we implemented agents that
optimize for a convex combination of their own individual
reward ekt and the collective reward of all other agents,∑N
i=1,i6=k e
i
t. Thus, the reward function for agent k is r
k
t =
ekt +η
∑N
i=1,i6=k e
i
t. We conducted the same hyperparameter
search over the parameters mentioned in Section 4.1 varying
the weight placed on the collective reward, η ∈ [0, 2].
As expected, we find that agents trained to optimize for
collective reward attain higher collective reward in both
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Cleanup Harvest
Hyperparameter A3Cbaseline
MOA
baseline
Influence
MOA
A3C
baseline
MOA
baseline
Influence
MOA
Entropy reg. .00176 .00176 .00176 .000687 .00495 .00223
lr init .00126 .00123 .00123 .00136 .00206 .00120
lr end .000012 .000012 .000012 .000028 .000022 .000044
Influence weight β - 0 .620 - 0 2.521
MOA loss weight - 1.312 15.007 - 1.711 10.911
Curriculum C - - 40 - - 226
Policy comparison - - KL - - KL
Train MOA only
when visible - False True - False True
Table 3: Optimal hyperparameter settings for the models in the model of other agents (MOA) experiment.
(a) Cleanup (b) Tragedy
Figure 7: Total collective reward obtained by agents trained
to optimize for the collective reward, for the 5 best hyperpa-
rameter settings with 5 random seeds each. Error bars show
a 99.5% confidence interval (CI) computed within a sliding
window of 200 agent steps.
Cleanup and Harvest, as is shown in Figure 7. In both
games, the optimal value for η = 0.85. Interestingly, how-
ever, the equality in the individual returns for these agents
is extremely low. Across the hyperparameter sweep, no
solution to the Cleanup game which scored more than 20
points in terms of collective return was found in which all
agents scored an individual return above 0. It seems that in
Cleanup, when agents are trained to optimize for collective
return, they converge on a solution in which some agents
never receive any reward.
Note that training agents to optimize for collective reward
requires that each agent can view the rewards obtained by
other agents. As discussed previously, the social influence
reward is a novel way to obtain cooperative behavior, that
does not require making this assumption.
5.3. Performance comparison between models and
related work
Table 4 presents the final collective reward obtained by each
of the models tested in the experiments presented in the
paper. We see that in several cases, the influence agents
are even able to out-perform the state-of-the-art results on
these tasks reported by (?), despite the fact that the solu-
tion proposed by (?) requires that agents can view other
agents’ rewards, whereas we do not make this assumption,
and instead only require that agents can view each others’
actions.
5.4. Collective reward and equality
It is important to note that collective reward is not always
the perfect metric of cooperative behavior, a finding that was
also discovered by ? and emphasized by ?. In the case, we
find that there is a spurious solution to the Harvest game, in
which one agent fails to learn and fails to collect any apples.
This leads to very high collective reward, since it means
there is one fewer agent that can exploit the others, and
makes sustainable harvesting easier to achieve. Therefore,
for the results shown in the paper, we eliminate any random
seed in Harvest for which one of the agents has failed to
learn to collect apples, as in previous work (?).
However, here we also present an alternative strategy for as-
sessing the overall collective outcomes: weighting the total
collective reward by an index of equality of the individual
rewards. Specifically, we compute the Gini coefficient over
the N agents’ individual environmental rewards ekt :
G =
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 |eit − ejt |
2N
∑N
i=1 e
i
t
, (6)
which gives us a measure of the inequality of the returns,
where G ∈ [0, 1], with G = 0 indicating perfect equality.
Thus, 1−G is a measure of equality; we use this to weight
the collective reward for each experiment, and plot the re-
sults in Figure 8. Once again, we see that the influence
models give the highest final performance, even with this
new metric.
5.5. Collective reward over multiple hyperparameters
Finally, we would like to show that the influence reward is
robust to the choice of hyperparameter settings. Therefore,
in Figure 9, we plot the collective reward of the top 5 best
hyperparameter settings for each experiment, over 5 random
seeds each. Once again, the influence models result in higher
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Cleanup Harvest
A3C baseline 89 485
Inequity aversion (?) 275 750
Influence - Basic 190 1073
Influence - Communication 166 951
Influence - Model of other agents 392 588
Table 4: Final collective reward over the last 50 agent steps for each of the models considered. Bolded entries represent
experiments in which the influence models significantly outperformed the scores reported in previous work on inequity
aversion(?). This is impressive, considering the inequity averse agents are able to view all other agents’ rewards. We make
no such assumption, and yet are able to achieve similar or superior performance.
collective reward, which provides evidence that the model
is robust to the choice of hyperparameters.
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(a) Cleanup - Basic influence (b) Harvest - Basic influence
(c) Cleanup - Communication (d) Harvest - Communication
(e) Cleanup - Model of other agents (f) Harvest - Model of other agents
Figure 8: Total collective reward times equality, R ∗ (1 − G), obtained in all experiments. Error bars show a 99.5%
confidence interval (CI) over 5 random seeds, computed within a sliding window of 200 agent steps. Once again, the models
trained with influence reward (red) significantly outperform the baseline and ablated models.
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(a) Cleanup - Basic influence (b) Harvest - Basic influence
(c) Cleanup - Communication (d) Harvest - Communication
(e) Cleanup - Model of other agents (f) Harvest - Model of other agents
Figure 9: Total collective reward over the top 5 hyperparameter settings, with 5 random seeds each, for all experiments. Error
bars show a 99.5% confidence interval (CI) computed within a sliding window of 200 agent steps. The influence models
still maintain an advantage over the baselines and ablated models, suggesting the technique is robust to the hyperparameter
settings.
